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Are there Asian diasporic laws in Britain?  
Reconsidering the presuppositions of legal pluralism  
Prakash Shah 
 
“The recovery of previously marginalised spheres is welcome; it is the mode of recognition that is 
problematic - their recovery within the discourse of law.” (Roberts 1998: 98) 
 
Abstract 
The concept of ‘Asian laws in Britain’ was proposed in the 1990s by a leading scholar of South Asian 
laws, Werner Menski, within the larger framework of legal pluralism. This article explores the reasons 
why it might be an attractive description and the possible reasons for its shortcomings, as well as a 
brief assessment of its take up more widely among scholars, officials, the communities to which it 
refers and others. The article examines the viability of this conception of Asian laws in the British 
diasporic sphere by entering the broader debate between the proponents of legal pluralism and their 
naysayers, identifying the main lines of dispute and its productive results as well as their limits in 
helping to make progress towards a theory of law. The mutual accusations of ethnocentrism, 
Eurocentrism or parochialism among the debate’s protagonists are discussed in order to identify how 
legal pluralists may be open to the charges they level against their opponents. The discussion is given 
more concrete form by drawing attention to the arguable non-universality of the domain of the 
normative upon which legal theorists and legal pluralists generally rely for their conception of law. If 
the domain of the normative is not universal, law itself cannot be universal as the legal pluralists claim. 
Although Muslim/Islamic law appears to have gained a large number of adherents among the 
reconstructed components of Asian laws in Britain, the discussion shows how another component - 
Hindu law - cannot be ‘law’ in the manner its proponents claim. The consequences for the viability of 
a conception of diasporic Asian laws in Britain are then drawn out. 
Keywords: Asian laws in Britain, legal pluralism, minority legal orders, Islamic law, Hindu law, angrezi 
shariat, angrezi dharma 
 
1. Introduction 
Adherence to legal pluralism extends to a growing chorus of social scientists, many of whom value its 
potential to ameliorate state-centrism in legal discourse. Legal pluralism has been found to be a useful 
way of capturing the social reality of post-colonial societies beyond the state-law nexus, and it is 
increasingly considered relevant with respect to immigrant and diaspora groups in Western countries. 
Legal pluralism has not been without its discontents, however. Among the well-known proponents of 
legal pluralism, Werner Menski and the late Franz von Benda-Beckmann, have confronted the 
emerging criticism of legal pluralist thought, expressed most prominently by Simon Roberts and Brian 
Z. Tamanaha. The ensuing exchanges exposed fundamental differences with respect to ‘strong’ or 
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‘new’ legal pluralism, with a central concern being the claim of legal pluralists to extend the property 
of law to all societies and cultures. Both sides have claimed that the other is implicated in 
ethnocentrism, Eurocentrism or parochialism. Despite their differences, both sides also share in 
common the assumption that law has something to do with the normative domain.  
In light of the debate between the legal pluralists and their opponents, this article examines Menski’s 
hypothesis about the emergence of Asian laws in Britain as advanced within the framework of legal 
pluralism. From the 1980s, Menski had proposed that South Asians were redeploying their cultural 
resources to reconstruct their laws in the British diaspora. In so doing, Menski was a pioneer in 
considering the application of the legal pluralist framework to such diaspora groups in Western 
countries. This article proposes that the problems identified with the claims of legal pluralists by their 
opponents also get imported into the conception of Asian laws in Britain, which appears euphemistic 
at best or entails a category mistake. Conversely, the claim to an Islamic law in the Western diaspora 
makes eminent sense and the answer to the question why may provide a useful route to developing 
a future theory of law.  
The first section of this article introduces the concept of Asian laws in Britain, the reasons why it might 
be an attractive description and the possible reasons for its shortcomings, as well as a brief assessment 
of its take up more widely among scholars, officials, the communities to which it refers and others. 
The second section goes into the discussions between the proponents of legal pluralism and their 
naysayers, tries to identify the main lines of dispute and the productive results of the discussions, as 
well as their limits in helping to make progress towards a theory of law. In the third section, the mutual 
accusations of ethnocentrism, Eurocentrism or parochialism among the debate’s protagonists are 
discussed in an effort to identify how legal pluralists may be open to the charges they level against 
their opponents. The discussion is given more concrete form by drawing attention to the arguable 
non-universality of the domain of the normative upon which all legal theorists and legal pluralists rely 
for their conception of law. If the domain of the normative is not universal, law itself cannot be 
universal as the legal pluralists claim. The third section ends with a brief discussion showing how Hindu 
law, among the components of Asian laws in Britain, cannot be ‘law’ in the manner its proponents 
claim. The conclusion sums up the consequences for the viability of a conception of Asian laws in 
Britain. 
 
2. Asian laws in Britain?  
In Britain, ‘Asians’ effectively meant, and still means, what contemporary academia, inspired by post-
war American usage, refers to as ‘South Asians’. Since it does not encompass migrant-descended 
groups from other parts of Asia, it looks increasingly ill fitting. Even its limited application to South 
Asians appears questionable, and is sometimes questioned, especially when it is used to disguise 
Muslim transgressions of societal mores. But the practice is now ingrained and appears difficult to 
dislodge; it is an established part of administrative, political, journalistic and academic speech as 
illustrated by the term ‘Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic’ (BAME), which is in wide public use. 
Werner Menski was the first to claim that the framework of legal pluralism could be used to describe 
the transplantation of customs resulting from the immigration of Asians into Britain. In a series of 
writings since the 1980s, he referred to legal pluralism in the Hindu marriage (Menski 1987) and Asian 
laws in Britain (Menski 1993). More recent work by Menski focused on Muslim law and legal pluralism 
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in Britain and elsewhere (Pearl and Menski 1998; Menski 2001).1 Menski claimed that that there was 
an ongoing unofficial reconstruction of law predominantly by groups of South Asian origin settling in 
Britain. This unofficial reconstruction was juxtaposed to the official law whose operations remained 
largely indifferent to processes of legal reconstruction among these groups. Other contemporaneous 
work excavating the same ground, especially by Sebastian Poulter, maintained the official 
classification of the phenomena and Menski criticised the dominant state-law framework exemplified 
in Poulter’s writings (also Menski 2006a: 58-65).  
The framework of legal pluralism was found attractive by this author (Shah 2005, 2008) who became 
a student of, taught alongside, and worked in collaboration with Menski. As Tamanaha (1993: 205) 
observed, the descriptor ‘law’ brings some importance and symbolic prestige in contrast to mere rules 
or norms. Legal pluralism thus seemed empowering and avoided the de-statusing of South Asian and 
other ethnic minority cultures implied in the rejection of official legal status. This rejection is standard 
within Western jurisdictions in contrast to the situation in other countries, not merely in South Asia, 
where legal systems provide official status to social customs and religious rules, which are sometimes 
designated as ‘personal laws’. Furthermore, in the diasporic context it seemed odd that the attribute 
of being ‘legal’, taken for granted during the pre-migration stage, would cease upon arrival in the 
West. Only a limited exception was provided by private international law (conflicts of law) which 
played the role of primary container for legal questions concerning these South Asian and other 
diasporas (Menski 2006a; Menski 2008: 48, 54). Adopting legal pluralism helped circumvent the 
undeclared embargo on research that previously ignored the situation of such diasporas except to the 
extent that they collided with official law (Menski 2006a: 21). A number of reasons therefore made 
compelling the descriptors ‘law’ and ‘legal’, as well as the framework of legal pluralism. 
In the same period, when this way of describing the situation of South Asian diasporas was being 
pioneered by Menski, he was developing his theoretical framework of legal pluralism in the context 
of comparative law globally (notably Menski 2006b). Establishing himself in the camp of scholars of 
‘strong legal pluralism’ (Griffiths 1986) or ‘new legal pluralism’ (Merry 1988; Tamanaha 2001: 115-
117), he joined those who rejected ‘weak legal pluralism’ (Griffiths 1986) or ‘classic legal pluralism’ 
(Merry 1988) as an account of recognition by state or official law, and adopted a broader description 
that transgressed the divide between official and unofficial fields. While it promised an immunisation 
from the vagaries of official recognition, it had more than merely theoretical consequences. As Menski 
(2006b: 61) noted: “It is too simple for lawyers to insist that multi-ethnic hybrids are not legal 
phenomena and may be ignored. But how far should this pluralisation and its legal recognition go? 
Starting a discussion implies and begins the process of more formal recognition.” Even in those non-
Western jurisdictions where official recognition of personal laws was entrenched, one could maintain 
a wider conspectus that enabled seeing and describing a variety of other domains as belonging to or 
impinging upon the legal sphere (e.g. Menski 2003). Consistent with De Sousa Santos (see Merry 1988: 
887-888), Menski (2003: 545-598) too saw legal pluralism as playing a key role in the postmodern 
conception of law.  
For a number of reasons, however, the legal pluralist enterprise has been coming under strain and 
seems less capable of offering a coherent approach to thinking about the situation of complexity 
within legal systems which experience cultural diversity as a consequence of mass migration. This is 
more obviously the case in situations where ‘weak legal pluralism’ or ‘classic legal pluralism’ of the 
personal law kind did not hold. After all, private international law isn’t compelled to engage with 
 
1 Menski (2008: 43-53) recounts this pioneering movement himself and elsewhere (Menski 2000) places it 
within the larger context of the study of South Asian laws. 
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personal law in the case of migrants coming from jurisdictions with legal structures dissimilar to those 
South Asian countries from which the bulk of post-war immigrants to Britain came. In the former case, 
legal professionals or those academics consulted by courts and tribunals for expertise on foreign laws 
or ethnic minority customs don’t need to refer to personal laws. Although it was the latter set of South 
Asian countries, especially India, which Menski (2006a) thought might hold lessons for handling 
problems of diversity in a Western-style legal system such as Britain’s, it isn’t clear that such lessons 
could be made available to address a broader set of diasporas. Furthermore, for Western countries, 
the larger South Asian countries have exemplified intolerance. While this is true of the ever-unfinished 
projects of Islamisation in Pakistan and Bangladesh, sustained propaganda in the West, not least from 
the sprawl of national and multilateral religious freedom bodies and a consensus among academics, 
ensures that India is considered little better. The latter’s anticipated push for a uniform civil code is 
no doubt going to be read as an anti-minority move.  
The limits to ‘strong’ or ‘new’ legal pluralism as a theoretical framework are intuitively picked out in 
the case of the mass immigration to the UK that accompanied the expansion of the EU in 2004. There, 
Kubal (2012: 38-46) considered but dismissed its usefulness in favour of the models that refer to ‘legal 
culture’ or ‘legal consciousness’. Without referring to Menski’s work, in her report written for the 
British Academy, Minority Legal Orders, Maleiha Malik (2012) adopts a typology distinguishing 
between ‘minority legal orders’, on the one hand, and merely ‘normative social regulation’ not 
amounting to being ‘legal’, on the other. She does that on the ground that the former have the means 
of institutional norm enforcement whereas the latter don’t. She observed the presence of Jewish, 
Christian and Muslim minority legal orders in Britain. She noted, however, that “Further research is 
necessary to establish whether other minority communities, such as Hindus, Sikhs and the Roma, have 
normative social regulation that is sufficiently institutionalised to be classified as a minority legal 
order” (Malik 2012: 50). Although Menski had foreseen that the framework of Asian laws would apply 
in the case of South Asian Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims (and Jains, Parsis and Christians) in the UK, as 
Malik’s report illustrates, it hasn’t actually been taken up to any significant extent for all these groups. 
British courts have occasionally made references to “the religious laws and practices of the Sikh faith” 
(Pawandeep Singh v. ECO, New Delhi [2004] EWCA Civ 1075, para. 2; Shah 2009: 118). However, other 
than for Muslims, describing the situation of the South Asian diaspora in terms of legal pluralism hasn’t 
caught on among academics or among non-Muslim South Asians themselves. Neither has immigration 
from other parts of Asia, other than by Muslims, been taken to entail some process of ‘legal’ 
reconstruction in the diaspora. 
Predictably, however, for describing the situation of Muslims (and not just South Asian Muslims), legal 
pluralism has found much greater appeal (e.g. Pearl and Menski 1998, 2001; Yilmaz 2005). Menski 
developed a term for it, angrezi shariat, which was recognised by the leading human rights lawyer and 
member of the House of Lords, Lord Lester (Grillo 2015: 105). The famous speech of February 2008 by 
the then Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, on the application of religious law in England 
attracted wide coverage and some controversy at the time. In the Q&A that followed the speech, Dr 
Williams gave a quite telling reply to one question which is worth quoting here:  
“Q: Why are we not asking similar questions of non-Abrahamic faiths, such as the increasingly 
marginalised Hindu society?” 
“Dr. Williams: I think there are many, many people of Hindu affiliation in this country who see 
themselves, understandably, as having been rather “ruled out” by the great focus, the great 
concentration on issues around Islam. And I don't think that's healthy. I think that there are 
many issues about how we relate to Hindu minorities here which need addressing. The 
difference of course is that you are not there dealing with, obviously not a single body, but a 
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tradition, a shared practice of jurisprudence, in the way that you are where Islam is 
concerned.” 
Legal pluralists would most likely disagree with the former Archbishop, as might the Indologist experts 
on Hindu law. However, in the partial appeal of the framework of legal pluralism and the idea that 
some groups, not others, undertake a process of legal reconstruction lie important clues about the 
potential direction in which a future discussion about the nature of law could take. To discover that 
we need to take the long road through the controversy accompanying the idea of legal pluralism.  
 
3. Legal pluralism and its critics 
Some four decades ago, when legal pluralism was not as fashionable as it has since become, Simon 
Roberts (1979: 204) posed the question:  
“What do we gain by insisting that particular arrangements should be characterized as ‘legal’, 
whereas others should not? It remains unclear how the use of this label can help us in the 
essential task of understanding what particular institutions look like, how particular processes 
work, and the ways in which these are to be distinguished analytically from those found in 
other contexts.”  
The problem Roberts raises is central to the legal pluralist enterprise although it hasn’t received a clear 
enough answer. Although Roberts (1979, 1998) was an early dissenter in legal anthropology, it was 
Tamanaha who emerged as a chief critic of legal pluralism since the 1990s. He characterised it as a 
“precociously successful doctrine” and one that had become one of the dominant concepts in the field 
of legal anthropology (Tamanaha 1993: 192; also Roberts 1998: 96; Menski 2006b: 90n on its 
dominance in the anthropology of law). Tamanaha (1993: 203-204, also Tamanaha 2011: 116) points 
to the disciplinary orientation of anthropological fieldwork which, although done initially on non-
Western post-colonial societies, inevitably became “aimed at home” i.e. once the practitioners 
became engaged in Western university faculties. Benda-Beckmann (2008) seemed to make similar 
suggestions about the difference between legal anthropologists, who would work mainly in the field 
in non-Western societies and tended to gravitate towards legal pluralism, and legal sociologists who 
did so less, and worked in tandem with the presupposition of law as state-law, the dominance of which 
became the chief target of the legal pluralists. Benda-Beckmann (who may have pioneered the term 
legal pluralism, Rechtspluralismus) is cited by Tamanaha (1993: 197) as having somewhat pejoratively 
said that “many legal sociologists submitted to, and inevitably romanticized the dominant legal 
system”. The most prominent of Asian legal pluralist scholars, Chiba (1998: 229-230), noticed the 
tendency among his Western legal sociologist colleagues to use the terminology of ‘legal culture’ and 
a correlative reluctance to use legal pluralism for the description of Western jurisdictions. This echoes 
the choice made by Kubal (2012) for her study of Polish immigrants in the UK. Despite such misgivings, 
Tamanaha (2001: 171) was able to report that some of the world’s leading socio-legal scholars had 
announced their allegiance to the concept of legal pluralism and plaudits regarding its potential kept 
accumulating. Tamanaha (2001: 175) suggested an even broader influence, citing an expanding list of 
social scientists and social theorists who rejected legal centralism and adopted legal pluralism, 
although he warned that this enthusiastic embrace of the current approach was premature. 
Whether legal anthropologists or otherwise, legal pluralists have viewed their main mission as being 
to correct modernity’s association of law with state-law only, the ‘state-law link’ or ‘state-law nexus’ 
as Benda-Beckmann (2002) described it. Summarising the positions held by Griffiths, Galanter, De 
Sousa Santos, Benda-Beckmann, and Sack, Tamanaha (1993: 194-195) characterised the legal 
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pluralists’ challenge as “uncompromising”. Tamanaha (1993: 197) encapsulated the reason behind the 
challenge: “the dominant (definitional) conception of the law sees the law as a product of the state. 
From an anthropological point of view, this linkage of law to the state is problematic. It implies that 
those societies without a state have no law.” In trying to correct the vision of law as state-law, the 
legal pluralists had gone on to extend their conception of law as going beyond the state and 
incorporating within it all kinds of other normative phenomena. Tamanaha (2001: 173) called this the 
“core credo” of legal pluralists. In place of the dominant adherence to the state-law link, the legal 
pluralist conviction is that “No society is without law” (Moore 1978: 215; Tamanaha 2001: 178). 
Rodolfo Sacco (1995: 459, noted by Roberts 2005: 6) provides the Italian reflection of this credo: 
“Wherever we find a society, we will find law.” 
Tamanaha (1993; 2001: 173-181) identified two problems with this enterprise. First, it leaves us 
without the ability to distinguish mere norms and the normative from law, leading to the question 
why we are interested in law as a distinct field at all and why (some) norms should be dressed up as 
legal and others not. Second, the conception of law that legal pluralists used, based on some functional 
idea of institutionalised norm formulation or enforcement (of the kind that Malik 2012 and Sandberg 
2016 still appear to find useful), was determined by extracting or emulating those elements essential 
to state law, and then subtracting all trappings of the state. Mainly for these reasons, Tamanaha 
concluded that, as with legal theorists, legal pluralists too had not had success in identifying law and 
should abandon their search since it presupposed an essentialist concept that was bound to elude 
them. 
Tamanaha (2001: 193-194) plumped for a “conventionalist” approach to law. He argued that law is a 
thoroughly cultural construct because of which no particular concept or definition can capture it, and 
this explains why the search for a concept or definition has eluded both legal theorists and legal 
pluralists. The variety of phenomena that the label law is attached to indicates that law is what we 
attach the label to. Tamanaha does not reject legal pluralism. He “clearly acknowledges the existence 
of legal pluralism” (Menski 2003: 587), but rejects the presupposition that all societies have law. As 
Tamanaha (2001: 194) says, “A state of ‘legal pluralism’ exists whenever more than one kind of ‘law’ 
is recognised through the social practices of a group in a given social arena which is a relatively 
common situation.” Far from being a rejectionist, Tamanaha provides a different, conventionalist basis 
to law and legal pluralism. What he rejects is a presupposed basis of law and legal pluralism in a 
claimed singular set of necessary criteria, which have not yet been discovered. He can therefore 
consistently say that a multiplicity of types of law exists and that we may speak of legal pluralism when 
they exist in the same social arena. This has some interesting consequences. State officials, especially 
in non-Western countries, might refer to religious or customary laws as laws recognised within the 
official field as part of their particular sort of social practice and we are encouraged by Tamanaha to 
treat this practice as ‘law’ because they do. However, a group of anthropologists or legal theorists 
whose social practice within university faculties, conferences, journals, etc. treats a body of norms 
and practices as ‘law’ may not bring to life a form of law although it “may later qualify as such if this 
understanding is related back to the social arena and is conventionally taken up (which has in fact 
occurred)” (Tamanaha 2001: 226). At the same time, one of the consequences of Tamanaha’s 
conventionalist approach is that if no group within a society refers to ‘law’, then there is no law in that 
society (Tamanaha 2001: 201).  
Tamanaha’s approach has attracted criticism, sometimes based on a caricatured image of what he 
actually advocated. Evidently spurred on by Tamanaha’s advocacy of “socio-legal positivism”, Menski 
(2003: 588) says that Tamanaha presents “a repackaged form of positivism”. He criticises Tamanaha 
on the ground that he “does not succeed in presenting a credible universal theory” (Menski 2003: 
7 
 
586n). If by that is meant that his account had to presuppose the presence of law in every society that 
is hardly what Tamanaha set out to do. Rather, the test of Tamanaha’s success has to be the degree 
to which he introduces scepticism regarding legal pluralist claims about the universality of law. Menski 
went on to chide Tamanaha for sarcastically suggesting that “the comparativist has to accept 
everything that is not legal as legal”, for mockingly describing the declaration of “all non-law to be 
equal to law as an absurd folly”, for circularly arguing that “law is simply law because someone said 
so”, and for lacking a “constructive academic response to pluralist reality” by fussing over boundaries 
and messiness (Menski 2006b: 66, 98, 186, 600). Woodman (1998: 41) thought Tamanaha (1993) was 
arguing that “the concept of law should be reserved for state law”. However, even if his earlier article 
was ambiguous on that point, he later made clear that his conventional approach did not exclude 
seeing non-state law as law as long as it was so recognised in the social practices of a group (Tamanaha 
2001). As discussed further below, the charge of ethnocentrism, etc. levelled at legal theorists by legal 
pluralists for their attachment to the state-law linkage is renewed against Roberts’ and Tamanaha’s 
claim that the legal pluralists’ conception of law is no more than “a self-conscious privileging of the 
folk categories of Western law” (Roberts 1998: 97, also Roberts 1979: 203-204).  
In his defence of the legal-pluralist position, Benda-Beckmann (2002: 42-44) argued that the task for 
anthropologists and comparative social scientists was to develop an analytic concept of law and legal 
pluralism useful for comparative purposes. He accepted that the focus on the state-law link was being 
overdone. Benda-Beckmann (2002: 48-49) saw law as a set of cognitive and normative conceptions 
that recognise and restrict the autonomy of a society’s members to behave and construct their own 
conceptions, all legal phenomena, including the cognitive conceptions, being normative in this sense. 
In other words, they must be cognitive and normative at the same time. Cognitive conceptions state 
how things are and why they are what they are; normative conceptions state how things ought to be, 
must be or may be. Although both Benda-Beckmann and Tamanaha pull away from claiming that they 
are developing any sort of theory of law, Benda-Beckmann seems to envisage that an analytic concept 
of law as progressed by legal pluralists, combined with empirical studies, would result in the 
development of a better theory of law. These responses are arguably productive results of Tamanaha’s 
(and Roberts’) challenge, even if as discussed further below, they carry their own limits and they did 
not comply with Tamanaha’s demand that a search for a transcultural conception of law be 
abandoned.  
Despite the glimmer of some productive results, we have not been able to progress very far down the 
road of understanding the phenomenon of law better. Tamanaha’s conventionalist definition would 
bring adat into the field of law because people within a given social arena refer to it as customary law 
or by its specific name adat by which they intend to refer to a form of law (Tamanaha 2001: 226). 
Tamanaha notes that often a label like ‘customary law’ will be will be used because that is what 
accords it status under the state law regimes which recognize customary law. It isn’t clear from his 
account how the transition from custom to customary law is made. In the case of adat, is it because 
this status derives from colonial recognition of it as a form of law (“Such references are not unusual 
in former colonized countries.”)? Or is it because adat gets recognised as a legal source by Islamic law 
and hence acquires legal status, at least for those for those Muslims who follow it? This leaves open 
the question of what non-Muslims should make of their adat. Is it required that adat should be a 
normative practice or would mere practice suffice? The adat illustration underscores the slippery 
nature of Tamanaha’s characterisation which results not merely from his unwillingness to commit to 
the possibility of a theory but also his conviction that such a theory is not possible.  
Arguably, Tamanaha’s main contribution to this debate is his compelling case that the legal pluralists 
have unduly extended a conception of law to all societies. However, his alternative, conventional 
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approach is not helpful beyond a certain point. Although it helps highlight that law is a cultural 
product, it doesn’t go further to explain why some cultures have needed law as an essential principle 
of order. His basically anti-theoretical approach is grounded in an argument that the sheer variety of 
phenomena to which the label law attaches itself necessarily entails abandoning the search for a 
theory of law. His conviction that the lack of an essential quality to law would inevitably elude legal 
theorists seems premature. It is arguable that such a theory has not been arrived at because of the 
self-imposed burdens or constraints by which its search has become encumbered. Although the legal 
pluralists have weaknesses in their approach they appear to leave open the possibility of a theory of 
law (Benda-Beckmann 2002: 74) or even demand a better one (Menski 2006b). But legal pluralists 
have fallen into theoretical laxity by proclaiming all kinds of phenomena as law and, as a matter of 
presupposition, attributing law universally to all societies. This requires not the abandonment of 
theory but greater rigour in how one arrives at that theory. A theory should account for law as a 
thoroughly cultural product but should not be misled into the route a conventionalist account takes 
us. Roberts (2005: 21) conveys a sense of this, saying “If we take Tamanaha seriously, we effectively 
turn our backs on an ‘analytic’ project altogether.” A theory would need to account for why some 
cultures carry an intuition of the necessity of law as a precondition for the sense of order and why 
others don’t. It need not endorse the universal claims of the legal pluralists and should countenance 
the lack of law in some societies or cultures. Such a theory would also entail that what is conventionally 
law in some contexts turns out not to be law under the constraints of the theory, while in other cases 
it does turn out to be law. It might also meet the recurring insistence, especially among writers trying 
to establish why religious laws are laws (Malik 2012; Sandberg 2016), that law requires some form of 
institutional norm enforcement, despite Tamanaha (1993; 2017) having already cut off this line of 
argument. It would address the unmanageable variety that concerns Tamanaha but would ask legal 
pluralists to renounce their core credo: “No society is without law…”. 
 
4. Ethnocentrism, Eurocentrism and parochialism 
The dispute between the legal pluralists and the naysayers involved mutually-levelled charges of 
ethnocentrism, Eurocentrism or parochialism. Legal pluralists defend the extension of their 
conception of law to beyond the domain of the state by claiming that the state-law association betrays 
an ethnocentrism, Eurocentrism or parochialism by privileging the concept of law of only one culture 
and denying others their conceptions. Tamanaha (1993: 197) summarises:  
“Since law has for the past several centuries been seen by the West as the singular 
characteristic of a civilized society, the ethnocentric implication of this linkage is that pre-state 
societies were uncivilized. The second objective of legal pluralism … is to combat this ethno-
centricity.” 
It hasn’t always been the case that the attribute ‘law’ was denied by Europeans to fellow humans they 
considered primitive. Notions such as primitive law, ancient law, heathen law and tribal law were seen 
as usual attributes of non-Western societies. Such descriptions carried with them an evolutionary 
religious hierarchy and were put to use to envelop some indigenous laws within some colonial legal 
regimes (Benda-Beckmann 2002: 52). The mere attribution of the property law to non-Western 
societies was therefore not considered incompatible with treating them as evolutionarily inferior or 
in colonising them. To describe non-Western societies as having law did not and cannot therefore act 
as a prophylactic to their unequal treatment.  
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Contrary to advocates of legal pluralism, the more recent and dominant strain among legal theorists, 
sociologists, and even some anthropologists made the existence of ‘law’ or ‘the legal’ dependent on 
organised sanctioning (Benda-Beckmann 2002: 52-53). As Hart contemplates, these non-advanced 
societies without secondary rules are “pre-legal”, which is seen as a “rather nasty” (Menski 2003: 
586n) resurrection of the kind of evolutionism preferably consigned to the past (Menski 2006b: 98-
103). This move is the main target of the accusation that there is an ethnocentrism, Eurocentrism or 
parochialism in denying the cultures of others the property of law, and supports the legal pluralists’ 
claim to extend that property to all cultures. The accusation is not mitigated by the observation of 
Tamanaha (1993: 197) that non-Western countries now all share with Western societies in having law 
because they also have the, albeit imposed, systems of law as a result of Western expansion. More 
precisely, they have a state and so have law too. However, this would still leave the cultures of (some) 
non-Western societies as not being legal and would celebrate as the legal dimension of those societies 
something that was imposed or borrowed under the pressure of Western imperialism, colonialism or 
globalisation. Although Tamanaha’s plea in mitigation is consistent with his own discussion of legal 
pluralism, one can see why it might not satisfy other legal pluralists. One might see then why Benda-
Beckmann (2002: 58) accuses both Roberts and Tamanaha for wanting to retain an ethnocentric folk 
category, and why he castigates Tamanaha’s conventionalist approach as amounting merely to a 
“multi-ethnocentric folk definition”. The extension of law based only on the conventionalist 
standpoint that Tamanaha argues for would disappoint the legal pluralists who regard law as an 
inherent and therefore universal feature of all cultures: “No society is without law….” The legal 
pluralists’ core credo holds not just horizontally in the present but for the past too; “legal pluralism is 
ancient”, says Menski (2006b: 85, also 117).  
The legal pluralists face another difficulty, however, in that their claim to extend law to all cultures 
can also be seen as a form of ethnocentrism, Eurocentrism or parochialism. That is, it attracts the very 
accusation that legal pluralists level against others but on the ground that the extension of law to all 
cultures universalises a parochial property of one or some cultures, “jamming” (Benda-Beckmann 
2002: 54) them into Western categories. As Roberts (1998: 98) had said, “so much of our sense of 
what law ‘is’, is bound up with, and has been created through, law's association with a particular 
history - early on, the emergence of secular government in Europe; later, the management of colonial 
expansion”. Naturally, the charge is disputed by the legal pluralists. Today they claim to have 
abandoned not only the hierarchical evolutionism of the past but also any strain of ethnocentrism 
that, admittedly, may have existed once. Benda-Beckmann (2002: 55), for instance, argues that, in 
incorporating an analytic concept of law, legal pluralists reject ethnocentric understandings entailed 
by translating certain characteristics of ‘western laws’ into their reading of normative orders in the 
non-Western world. He throws back the accusation of ethnocentrism at critics like Roberts and 
Tamanaha: “They impose their ethnocentric legal ideology on other peoples’ normative orders and 
exclude anything from being ‘legal’ that does not conform to that ideology.” Benda-Beckmann appears 
to overlook the fact the ethnocentrism isn’t dissolved merely by extending law universally, especially 
if its conceptualisation is specific to some cultures or societies. Wouldn’t comparative study benefit 
by looking deeper into the question whether some societies may not possess law of any kind?  
Resistance to the suggestion that Western ethnocentrism or parochialism continues to characterise 
social science descriptions of non-Western societies seems grounded in little more than an article of 
faith, an auxiliary credo, as it were. It evidences faith that a distance from the conceptions picked up 
through socialisation in one’s own society must somehow have been achieved at some point in one’s 
career but doesn’t prove it. Consider the following passages by Benda-Beckmann (2002: 54-55):  
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“Yet it would also be naive to maintain that social scientists could not distance themselves 
from the meanings which have been developed in their own society, and that they would 
necessarily be forced to adopt (or keep running after) those definitions provided by powerful 
or hegemonic agents. Why should one argue like this at all? Why should one treat law so very 
differently from other categories we use for comparative purposes: religion, politics, 
marriage, and property? Why is it so impossible to take distance from the parochial 
understanding of law and develop it into a wider category useful for looking at differences and 
similarities between different historical manifestations of law?  
… 
“Moreover, statements condemning the use of law and legal pluralism on these grounds are 
frequently apodictically and unsupported by an analysis of the work of scholars who allegedly, 
by using law, incorporate ethnocentric understandings into their writings. It is by no means 
that case that researchers during the past 30 years would usually have translated certain 
characteristics of 'western laws' - such as their ideologies of court decision making (rules 
determine outcomes), the functional differentiation of adjudication, the differentiation 
between law and politics - into their reading of normative orders in the non-western world. 
Proponents of a wider analytical concept of law explicitly formulate the properties of the 
concept in a way that does not include ethnocentric British, Minangkabau or Barotse elements 
into the definition of law but sees them as variations.” 
Although posed in terms of epistemological problems, the questions are rhetorical in nature. The 
context suggests that proposing anything other than that the necessary distance has been acquired to 
avoid parochialism would be a fool’s errand (“it would also be naïve”). However, the conviction in the 
human sciences regarding religion’s universality depends on Christian theological claims 
(Balagangadhara 1994) and, therefore, a form of Western parochialism. The conviction about the 
necessity of secularism as the solution to religious conflict (De Roover 2015) and about the Indian 
caste system (Farek et al 2018) is founded on Protestant claims about Indian religion. If these are 
instances of ethnocentrism or parochialism, they appear to be endemic to the social sciences 
(Balagangadhara 2012), and not only preceded Benda-Beckmann’s defence of legal pluralism but have 
continued thereafter.  
Examples may be demanded, though, whether legal pluralists have abandoned their parochialism. 
One example is furnished by the universal consensus that law is something to do with the normative. 
The consensus holds among not only legal pluralists but legal theorists too. If one examines a sample 
of the literature on legal theory or legal pluralism, there is little doubt that what is being discussed, 
even in the narrow or expanded versions of the idea of ‘law’ is the sphere of the ‘normative’. If 
anything unites the disputing camps today, it is that they take for granted that what we are talking 
about is some aspect of the normative field or the “normative stew” of which Tamanaha (2017: 196) 
speaks. The main body of legal pluralists would want to claim that all societies must have some sense 
of normativity and therefore fulfil the minimal necessary condition for having law. Twining (2000: 231) 
claims, “everyone experiences normative pluralism as a fact every day of their lives.” Or the normative 
is used together with law in such a way that no clear boundary is established (e.g. Twining 2000: 85, 
231). In some cases (e.g. Merry 1988), the use of ‘normative’ fields and such like virtually replaces the 
term law, submerging law back into the “normative stew”. Even objectors to the claim of law as a 
universal property of all societies, such as Tamanaha, argue about whether all normative phenomena 
are law and not vice versa. Minimally, therefore, to be ‘law’ a phenomenon must display normative 
characteristics, even if not all normative phenomena need be ‘law’. This is where a hitherto 
underestimated insight provided by Roberts proves interesting. He says (Roberts 1979: 25-26): 
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“Take first the idea of a legal rule. At the root of everyday life in any society there must 
necessarily be some patterns of habitual conduct followed by the members, providing a basis 
upon which one member will be able to predict how another is likely to behave under given 
circumstances and how his own actions will be received. But in some small-scale societies a 
normative base for these regularities is not clearly conceptualized or articulated; people 
simply do not always think in terms of rules and obligations. Even where they do, there is 
almost never found a separate class of ‘legal rules’, distinguished in function and organization 
from other types of norm in quite the way that this category is within our own society. Norms 
of polite behaviour, moral standards and a class of mandatory rules taken most seriously in 
the event of a dispute may not be distinguished in indigenous classifications. Thus, our point 
of departure in a clearly defined corpus of legal rules can provide little help in the study of 
these groups; nor can we be sure that people in another culture will think and speak in terms 
of ‘ought’ propositions at all.”  
Further on Roberts (1979: 170) remarks:  
“While we tend to think and speak freely about normative propositions, this is not always the 
case elsewhere. As early researchers found to their surprise, some peoples have difficulty in 
supplying an inventory of their ‘laws and customs’, or indeed thinking and talking in normative 
terms at all.”  
Roberts is suggesting that a normative base for action, obligations, legal rules, and ‘ought’ propositions 
may not be conceptualised at all in some, small-scale societies. He goes on to discuss the absence of 
other elements of what is familiarly considered proper to law in these societies and draws out (Roberts 
1979: 27-28) the logical conclusion:  
“Given this lack of ‘fit’ between our own legal arrangements and the control mechanisms in 
the societies we shall be considering, and the consequent inapplicability of much of our legal 
theory, it seems best to avoid centring the discussion upon law altogether. Were we to insist 
upon doing so, the term ‘law’ would either have to be used excessively loosely, or else we 
would need to exclude from consideration control mechanisms which in many societies hold 
central importance.” 
The inference is tremendously important. Although the route taken is different, it supports the idea 
that “law is a thoroughly cultural construct” (Tamanaha 2001: 193, although the exact consequences 
of its ‘construction’ may differ from what Tamanaha had in mind) and "it is conceivable that there will 
be societies without law" (Tamanaha 2001: 201).  
The proposition that there are cultures that do not have normativity is supported by the hypothesis 
suggested by Balagangadhara (2012: 84) that in India and China the ‘ethical’ domain itself is 
constructed differently: not on religion as it is in the West. (We part company with Roberts (2005: 14) 
who ends up suggesting that in these societies here is normativity and something like law.) In Asia, 
ethical language is not a normative language; ethical relations are factual relations; people act 
ethically without needing norms of ethical behaviour. In turn this hypothesis is supported in a central 
claim made by Balagangadhara (1994) that Asia is culture without religion. We find similar suggestions 
regarding the “pre-legal” ancient Greeks of whom Kelly (1992, cited in Menski 2006b: 135) says: 
“There is no apparent consciousness of custom as something normative.” In these cases, we may or 
may not be talking about only the small-scale societies that Roberts had in mind.  
In following the consequences of these suggestions we do not have to subscribe to Tamanaha’s 
conventionalist approach to law. We also do not need to accept the idea that the parochialism 
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unwittingly extended by legal pluralists into a universal claim for all societies and cultures is only 
because they do not share a history of the emergence of secular government in Europe and did not 
engage in colonial expansion (Roberts 1998: 98). Law may well be a cultural construct, as Tamanaha 
suggests, but it isn’t inconceivable that law may itself be tied to (Semitic) religion - in the sense of 
Balagangadhara’s theorisation - in ways that have yet to be explored and deepened. If it is so, it would 
account for the decisions made by Rowan Williams and Maleiha Malik. It would be possible to see law 
not merely as a conventional phenomenon but one that can be theorised about. Such a theorisation 
does not entail a commitment to seeing law as a universal but it should be able to explain how law 
has emerged as a property of some but not other cultures.  
The second illustration of parochialism is to do with the construction of Hindu law, which is said by 
Menski (2003: 591-598) to be a component of Asian laws in Britain. It is evident enough that Indians 
had produced the literary and practical tradition of dharmashastra (which spread beyond India). 
Textual elements of this tradition were taken up by the British during the early colonial period and 
reconstituted into what became known as the Hindu law. Suggestions are not lacking (e.g. 
Bhattacharya-Panda 2008; De Roover 2011) that the Hindu law thus developed bore a resemblance 
to an underlying template of canon law and was made despite the fact that the use to which the 
dharmashastric tradition was put prior to colonisation bore no relationship to the concept of law that 
the colonists had brought with them. Some writers (Davis 2010; Olivelle 2018) continue to view the 
dharmashastric tradition as theology, seeing Hinduism as a religion as the Semitic religions are, despite 
all the problems such a view papers over (Balagangadhara 1994). Meanwhile, in another camp, Menski 
(2003) acknowledges that Western distortions coloured the colonial exercises defying tradition but 
insists that the dharma to which the dharmashastric tradition referred is what contains the core 
concept of Hindu law. As “angrezi dharma, a form of dharma unique to British Hindus” (Menski 2003: 
592), it is spread transnationally via migration, and is a part of the Asian laws in Britain. It is a cognate 
to the angrezi shariat of the Muslims. However, suggestions also abound that the Indians lack any 
European-like notion of law and that dharma is not the same as law (e.g. Menski 2003: 42-43, 74-75; 
though with certainty that law = dharma, see Davis 2010: 22). So the assertion that dharma is what 
the Hindu law is is question-begging and entails the contradiction “dharma is not law and yet is law”. 
The argument has other weaknesses: “If indeed all human societies have law (Moore 1978), why 
should ancient Hindu societies be any different?” asks Menski (2003: 43). Well, there may be multiple 
reasons why one culture possesses a property that another does not and the dependence on the core 
credo of the legal pluralists no longer provides a firm foundation for claiming that Hindus too have 
law. The Hindu law problem is, from one perspective then, an instance of the larger problem the legal 
pluralists face in their insistence on the universality of law instantiating the kind of “jamming” that 
Benda-Beckman referred to.  
 
5. Conclusion: Meaningful silence? 
At various points in his work Menski (especially 2006b) points out the silence with which Western 
conceptions of law and their purveyors are greeted by those outside their framework, be they Chinese, 
Hindus or Africans. Such silences are described variously as being “meaningful”, “strategic”, or 
“significant”. Since many things can be read into silence it is obviously difficult to attribute any 
particular property to it or to identify specific reasons to explain it. However, a notable aspect of the 
proposition of Asian laws in Britain is the silence with which it is greeted. Evidently, that is not so for 
one of its claimed components, Islamic or Muslim law in Britain, which instead appears to have 
received wide endorsement by both Muslims and non-Muslims, functionaries and laypeople alike, 
whether or not they use the term angrezi shariat. The other components that ostensibly compose 
13 
 
Asian laws in Britain aren’t endorsed in anything like the same way and have mostly been ignored by 
both fellow academics and by members of those population groups which are claimed to display the 
properties that the descriptor ‘law’ would attribute to them. One can draw the consequences from 
this that Tamanaha might: because the concerned groups don’t ‘own’ the conception of their 
customary practices as being legal by convention they can’t be law. It wouldn’t be enough for 
anthropologists or legal pluralists to routinely refer to their customs as legal (Tamanaha 2001: 226). 
However, there are more fundamental reasons why the conception of Asian laws in Britain cannot 
work. Legal pluralists and their opponents may agree that law is a thoroughly cultural product but they 
draw quite different consequences from this insight. The legal pluralists would want to maintain that 
law is nonetheless universal whereas their opponents say that law isn’t a universal property of all 
cultures and societies. However, Tamanaha’s opposition to the legal pluralists is limited by his 
unhelpful conventionalist approach to law and his arguing against the possibility of a theory of law. A 
theory of law is what is needed in order to enable a distinction to be made between those societies 
and cultures which have or don’t have law. A theory would need to account for why some cultures 
carry an intuition of the necessity of law as a precondition for the sense of order and why others don’t. 
Although legal pluralists are in principle open to such theorisation, it is bound to have consequences 
for their claim of universality: it would destroy it. Legal pluralists are already vulnerable to the charge 
of ethnocentrism, Eurocentrism or parochialism that they have levelled against others. If one takes up 
the conviction that law is to do with the normative domain, it can be shown that the sense of the 
normative isn’t universal, and the fact that they have been promoting it as universal underscores their 
parochialism. If the sense of the normative isn’t universal, then the claim that law is a universal cannot 
stand either. Although long held in abeyance, Simon Roberts’ insight may well be tenable. A 
conception such as Hindu law can also be shown to be incoherent or merely dependent on the 
unsupportable claim of law’s universality. This has fundamental consequences for any conception of 
Asian laws in Britain, which can’t be supported either, except in so far as some components of the 
South Asian population, Muslims in particular, have law. These arguments do not exempt scholars 
from continuing to study the interactions of South Asians and other diasporas with the state legal 
systems in their countries of settlement. They merely mean that the framework of legal pluralism as 
currently practiced may fail to provide a viable template to do so. Its weakness has implications 
beyond what we think of Asian laws in Britain …  
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